W is now 0-3 in making historical analogies for Iraq occupation

The following commentary is the work of John Peeler. I'm posting it here on his behalf. For those keeping score, Bush has tried analogizing the Iraq occupation to WWII, Vietnam and now Korea. He's 0 for 3. Will Greneda be next?

Grasping at Straws:

Iraq and the Korean Analogy

John Peeler

President Bush has recently been arguing that our mission in Iraq ought to be seen as equivalent to our maintenance of troops in South Korea for more than fifty years. That he would resort to such a pathetic analogy is a measure of his desperation to lock in American commitment to a war that has lost the support of the people.

The decision to put American troops in South Korea was to defend an established government in response to a massive invasion from North Korea. It was in the strategic context of the early Cold War and the prevalent doctrine of containment of Communist expansion. The war in Iraq was an invasion BY US of another country, for the purpose of overthrowing a government objectionable to us, and replacing it with one more to our liking.

Although American troops carried the major burden in the Korean War, the defense of South Korea was conducted under United Nations authorization. The United States failed to get such authorization for invading Iraq in 2003 (in contrast, both the 1991 expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, and the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and overthrow of its Taliban government, were UN-authorized).

The core of Bush’s argument is that since the Korean Armistice of 1953, the United States has maintained a military presence in South Korea for more than fifty years, to deter renewed attacks from the North. It is asserted that we should expect a similar long-term commitment in Iraq. In South Korea, though, our continued presence has been steadily supported by popular majorities and by a succession of increasingly democratic governments. In Iraq, all available public opinion surveys show that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis, regardless of sect or ethnicity, want us out, now. Some elements of the political elite and the government obviously want us to stay, because we put them in power and they would have to leave with us if we left.

It is of course important to remember that South and North Korea were client states set up by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, after World War II, and the failure to unify them was a reflection of the Cold War (very much like East and West Germany or North and South Vietnam). Neither the South Korean regime nor that of the North was much more than a puppet in 1950, when war broke out. Over time, South Korea has become a prosperous industrial democracy.

Bush argues that Iraq could evolve in a similar way. There is a remote chance that he will be proven right, but the realities of a country divided along ethnic and religious lines, and immersed in a region suffering enormous, violent conflicts, justify extreme skepticism about Iraq’s democratic prospects.

Our continued presence in South Korea is intended to deter attacks by North Korea. In Iraq, notwithstanding overdrawn assertions of a threat from Iran, the fundamental mission is, and would remain, to protect Iraqis we favor from those we oppose. Those we favor will be a small minority. The longer we stay, the more the majority of Iraqis will oppose us. This is not a posture we will want to maintain for fifty years. We would be occupying a hostile country.